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Abstract 
The contribution describes the peculiarities of the 
protection of the right to property in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. It has 
been found that, given the peculiarities of the 
legal nature of the right to property, it requires 
state regulation and may be subject to restriction 
and interference. Attention is drawn to the 
predication of any potential interference with the 
right to property on a general principle, 
according to which everyone has the right to 
peacefully enjoy their property. 
The article further clarifies the forms of 
interference with the ownership of individuals 
and legal entities by the state, such as 
expropriation of property and control over use of 
property. The triple normative regulation of 
property relations is investigated, and the 
elements of the relevant structure were covered 
in detail. 
The contents of the three-component test, in 
particular, its elements, such as the legality of 
interference with the right to property, the 
legitimacy of the purpose of such interference, 
   
Анотація  
 
У роботі розкрито особливості здійснення 
захисту права власності в практиці 
Європейського суду з прав людини. З’ясовано, 
що, виходячи з особливостей правової природи 
права власності, воно вимагає регулювання з 
боку держави та може підлягати обмеженню та 
втручанню. Звернено увагу на обумовленість 
можливого втручання у право власності 
загальним принципом, відповідно до якого 
кожен має право на мирне володіння своїм 
майном.  
З'ясовано форми втручання у власність 
фізичних та юридичних осіб з боку держави, 
такі як позбавлення власності та контроль за 
користуванням майном. Досліджено троїсте 
нормативне регулювання відносин власності, 
детально охарактеризовано елементи 
відповідної структури.  
На підставі аналізу рішень ЄСПЛ розкритo 
зміст трискладового тесту, зокрема, таких 
елементів як законність втручання у право 
власності, легітимність мети такого втручання 
та справедлива рівновага між інтересами 
захисту права власності та загальними 
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and a fair balance between the interests of 
protection of the right to property and public 
interests, are expounded with reference to the 
awards of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Particular attention was paid to legality 
provisions. The contribution further dwells on 
the conceptual and categorical framework of the 
terms “general interest” and “public interest.” 
The authors complete their scientific inquiry with 
appropriate generalisations and a summary. 
 
Key words: European Court of Human Rights, 
interference with the ownership right, lawfulness 
of interference, legitimate purpose of 
interference, proportionality of interference, 
control over the use of property, public 
(common) interest. 
 
інтересами. Особливу увагу приділено вимогам 
щодо законності. розкрито понятійно-
категоріальний апарат таких термінів як 
«загальний інтерес», «інтереси суспільства». 
На основі здійсненого наукового пошуку  
авторами зроблено узагальнення та підведено 
підсумки.  
 
Ключові слова: Європейський суд з прав 
людини, втручання у право власності, межі 
допустимого втручання, законність втручання, 
легітимна мета втручання, пропорційність 
втручання, контроль за використанням майна, 
суспільні (загальні) інтереси. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emergence of rule of law and social and 
democratic state is closely linked to the 
implementation of a proper system of legal 
protection of such fundamental human rights as 
the right to property. The right to property is a 
universal value, a fundamental right guaranteed 
by the state, the exercise of which is instrumental 
in meeting the needs of the individual and 
ensuring the proper conditions and standard of 
living. Effective guarantees of the exercise of the 
right to property and its reliable and effective 
protection constitute important attributes of rule 
of law, which acquires a new relevance against 
the backdrop of European integration processes 
and with a view to existing political, economic 
and social problems in modern society. 
 
The right of property is protected at the highest 
supranational level under Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The 
Convention operates as an instrument of 
protection of the right to property: 1) at the 
national level – as part of relevant international 
obligations of the state; 2) at the international 
level – as a form of collective redress 
implementable through a conventional 
jurisdictional institution – the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinafter, the “ECHR”). 
 
The clarification of the provisions of the 
Convention and Protocol No. 1, and their 
practical implementation are based on the 
interpretations provided by the European Court 
of Human Rights in its resolutions, which are 
ipso facto binding on law-making and law 
enforcement, specifically in the interpretation 
suggested by the ECHR. 
 
In general, the awards of the ECHR operate as a 
sort of blueprint for courts, as they indicate what 
criteria and circumstances are to be evaluated and 
the manner, in which they are to be evaluated. 
However, the final outcome of the resolution of 
a specific dispute (whether to meet or reject the 
claim) pertains to the discretion of a national 
court. Therefore, the question remains as to what 
criteria should be evaluated by national courts in 
order to conclude on the admissibility and 
legality of state interference with the right to 
property in terms of its compliance with Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1. 
 
Methodology 
 
In the course of this study, general and special 
legal methods of scientific inquiry were used in 
combination. The dialectical method contributed 
to the exploration of property relations in the 
practice of the ECHR. This method was also used 
to analyse such dialectical categories as legality, 
public interest, and proportionality. The 
comparative method was used to correlate such 
categories as “general interest” and “public 
interest.” 
 
For the processing and use of empirical material 
and the case law of the ECHR, a formal legal 
method was applied, which made it possible to 
describe the content of forms of interference with 
the right to property of individuals and legal 
entities by the state. The hermeneutical method 
enabled the exploration of the content of the 
provisions of the Convention and Protocol No. 
thereto. Methods of analysis and synthesis were 
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used to determine the constituent elements of the 
three-component test. 
 
Ultimately, the logical method enabled us to 
come up with closing statements and appropriate 
generalisations. This method also ensured the 
consistency of our opinions, concepts and 
conclusions expressed. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms states as follows: “Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of 
international law. The preceding provisions shall 
not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary 
to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties” 
(Protocol No. 1, Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1952). 
 
The content of this regulation implies that it is 
aimed at the protection of the rights of “every 
person,” that is, any individual, regardless of 
whether such person is the national of the state 
whose actions they contest. Furthermore, an 
individual may rely on the protection of their 
rights of property irrespective of whether they 
have acquired such rights as an individual or in 
connection with the exercise of public authority. 
For instance, in the case Former King of Greece 
and Others v. Greece, the applicant was the 
former King of Greece, who sought protection of 
property received from the state during his reign 
(ECHR, Case Former King of Greece and Others 
v. Greece, 2000). 
 
In addition, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is the only 
conventional regulation that directly provides for 
the protection of the property of legal entities. It 
is important to note that not every legal entity 
may apply to the ECHR. Thus, a legal entity that 
holds that its rights under the Convention and 
Protocols thereto were violated may file a 
petition if it is a non-governmental organisation 
within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
Convention. It was on this basis that the ECHR 
declined to consider the application submitted by 
the State Holding Company Luganskvugillya, 
concluding that “the applicant company … was 
registered as a corporation, owned and managed 
by the State, which participated in the exercise of 
governmental powers in the area of management 
of coal industry, having a public-service role in 
that activity of the State (ECHR, Decision by 
State Holding Company LUGANSKVUGILLYA 
against Ukraine, 2009). 
 
Turning to the content of the article under study, 
we should pay close attention to its three-fold 
regulatory structure. The first rule, of a general 
nature, proclaims the principle of peaceful 
enjoyment of property; the second rule relates to 
cases of expropriation of property and predicates 
this to specific conditions. The third rule 
recognises that States have the right, in 
particular, to control the use of property, in line 
with general interest, by introducing laws they 
deem necessary to achieve such a purpose 
(Fuley, 2015). 
 
For the state, the principle of peaceful enjoyment 
of property means not only the obligation to 
refrain from any actions that may lead to 
interference with the right of a person to peaceful 
enjoyment of property, but also to the existence 
of certain affirmative actions that are necessary 
and constitute preconditions for such peaceful 
enjoyment of property resulting from the fact that 
the state is under an obligation to guarantee to 
everyone under its jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms set out in Section I of the Convention 
(Novikov, 2016). 
 
The principle of inviolability of the right to 
property is considered to be the basic principle of 
legal regulation of property relations both at 
national and international levels, in which special 
attention is paid to lawfulness and legality, 
observance of the principles of “fair balance” in 
the case of interference with the right to property, 
the availability of fair compensation. At the same 
time, this principle is upheld by a number of other 
safeguards provided for by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such safeguards 
include, in particular, the right to a fair trial 
(Article 6), the right to an effective remedy 
(Article 13), the prohibition of discrimination 
(Article 14), and the prohibition of abuse of 
rights (Article 17) (Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950). The essence of these safeguards consists 
not so much in the fact that a breach of 
conventional obligations triggers the response of 
all member states, but in the fact that the response 
to such breach is based on a shared will and 
shared values. 
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Given the peculiarities of the legal nature of the 
right to property, it requires state regulation and 
may be subject to restriction and interference. 
In analysing the case law of the ECHR, it may be 
inferred that any act by the state aimed at 
depriving, restricting or impairing a person’s 
right to own, use and dispose of their property 
within the limits stipulated in the Convention 
constitutes interference with the right to property. 
Consistent with the provisions of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1, there are two forms of 
interference with the right to property of 
individuals and legal entities by the state: 
expropriation of property and control over the 
use of property. 
 
On most occasions, interference with the right to 
property of individuals and legal entities is made 
by public authorities, in particular, executive 
bodies, occasionally – by legislative and judicial 
authorities, by enacting regulations or passing 
court judgements, whereas Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 excludes any unjustified interference by 
public authorities (Fuley, 2017). Thus, in its 
judgment in the case Budchenko v. Ukraine, the 
ECHR admitted that there had been an 
interference with the applicant’s right under 
Article 1 of Protocol No. to the Convention 
resulting from the fact that no mechanism was in 
place for the implementation of a legislative 
provision, which granted the applicant an 
exemption from payment for electricity and 
natural gas consumed, which was of material 
interest under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (ECHR, 
Case Budchenko v. Ukraine, 2014). 
 
Moreover, in exceptional cases there is an 
encroachment of one state upon the property 
(assets) of another state, as jurisdiction is not 
restricted to the national territories of the member 
states to the Convention. The responsibility of 
the state applies equally to cases where any 
action or omission results in certain 
consequences outside its territory. 
 
The Court has repeatedly considered cases, the 
subject of which involved the state’s 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in exercising its 
powers abroad. The first case where the Court 
ruled on just satisfaction in interstate cases was 
the case Cyprus v. Turkey (ECHR, Case Cyprus 
v. Turkey, 2001). In the case Xenides-Aestis v. 
Turkey, the ECHR ordered Turkey to pay 
plaintiff a compensation for their inability to use 
the property remaining in the occupied territory 
of Northern Cyprus (ECHR, Case Xenides-Aestis 
v. Turkey, 2005). In many respects, this case is 
similar to the case Loizidou v. Turkey (ECHR, 
Case Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996) and Demades v. 
Turkey (ECHR, Case Demades v. Turkey, 2003). 
The ruling of the ECHR in the case 
Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece 
(ECHR, Case Papamichalopoulos and Others v. 
Greece, 1995) was progressive in nature, as the 
Court concluded that the de facto expropriation 
of land constituted a continuing violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 
 
In its case law, the ECHR has developed three 
main criteria that shall be assessed in order to 
determine whether a particular measure of 
interference with the right to property meets the 
principle of legitimate and admissible 
interference with the guarantees of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1. We speak here of the limits of 
permissible interference, namely: a) the 
existence of legal grounds (legality of 
interference); b) the existence of a “public 
interest” to apply restrictions (legitimate purpose 
of interference); c) ensuring a fair balance 
(proportion) between the public interest and the 
need to respect the fundamental rights of the 
individual (proportionality of interference). 
Thus, the provisions of legality constitute 
common standards for all articles of the 
Convention. 
 
The interpretation of legality in line with the 
European approach to the rule of law and the case 
law of the ECHR is significantly different from 
the principle of legality prevailing in the 
domestic literature; therefore, in considering the 
legality and principle of legality, one should 
proceed not from the national interpretation of 
this principle, but from the understanding of this 
term by the ECHR, which the latter came to by 
using an autonomous interpretation of concepts 
such as “law,” “in compliance with law,” and 
“established by law.” The word “autonomous” is 
understood to refer to concepts denoted by 
appropriate terms that may be interpreted by the 
Court irrespective of their meaning in national 
law (Hudyma, 2016). 
 
In its report, the Venice Commission considers 
legality, in the sense of supremacy of law, as a 
structural element of the rule of law, emphasising 
that provisions of law should be complied with 
consistently (Venice Commission Report, 2011). 
As a criterion for interference with the right to 
property of a person, legality means that such 
interference shall be made within and on the 
basis of law, in compliance with the principle of 
rule of law, which includes freedom from 
arbitrariness. Thus, Paragraph 50 of the judgment 
in the case Shchokin v. Ukraine stipulates that the 
requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
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Convention is that any interference by public 
authorities with the peaceful enjoyment of 
property shall be lawful, and that the 
expropriation of property is only possible 
“subject to the conditions provided for by law” 
(ECHR, Case Shchokin v. Ukraine, 2010). The 
phrase “subject to the conditions provided for by 
law” first implies that the measure in question 
have a basis in national law (ECHR, Case 
Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 2003). 
 
Interference shall not merely be based on 
domestic law, but law itself shall meet certain 
quality standards. The category of “quality of 
law” includes a variety of attributes that reflect 
its essence and specific nature, namely: 
accessibility, clarity, predictability and a 
sufficiently clear determination of discretionary 
powers delegated to the authorities and the 
manner, in which such discretionary powers are 
exercised. 
 
Therefore, the law shall meet these requirements. 
Firstly, law shall be adequately accessible. 
Accessibility means that such law shall be made 
known to everyone whose behaviour, rights and 
obligations it regulates. Such accessibility, in 
turn, operates as a guide to legal behaviour and 
its consequences. The availability of law is 
always linked to its official promulgation, when 
a person is provided the opportunity to become 
aware of the provisions contained therein and to 
develop orientation as to what legal provision is 
applicable in specific circumstances. 
 
In elucidating the substance of this category, the 
ECHR assumes that “law” shall be appropriately 
accessible: any citizen shall be able to obtain 
adequate information on the circumstances of the 
application of the legal provisions in a particular 
case (ECHR, Case Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, 2003). 
Secondly, law shall meet the quality requirement, 
that is, be clear and predictable. 
 
Consistent with the long-lasting case law of the 
ECHR, law shall be worded with sufficient 
clarity (precision) to enable a person to regulate 
their behaviour. In the case Steel and Others v. 
the United Kingdom, the ECHR noted that all 
rights, whether written or unwritten, shall be 
sufficiently clear so that a person, where 
reasonably necessary, could reasonably 
anticipate, whether independently or with an 
appropriate legal assistance, the consequences of 
any action taken by such person (EHRR, Case 
Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 1998). 
 
The interpretation and application of national law 
constitutes the prerogative of the national 
authorities. However, the Court is required to 
ensure that the manner, in which national law is 
interpreted and applied, results in the 
consequences that are consistent with the 
principles of the Convention in terms of their 
interpretation in the light of the Court’s case-law 
(award in Case ECHR of Serkov v. Ukraine, 
2011). 
 
It should be noted that whenever the ECHR finds 
that national law does not meet the requirements 
of “quality of law,” it will find a violation without 
analysing compliance with other laws and 
without resorting to the analysis of other criteria 
for the legality of interference with the right to 
property. 
 
The second element of the three-component test, 
compliance with which is verified by the ECHR, 
is the legitimate purpose of interference. 
 
Thus, interference with the right to property is 
permissible only to the extent it is made in order 
to safeguard public interest. The ECHR does not 
provide a definition of public interest or an 
exhaustive list of public interests, for which the 
state may restrict the right to property, and only 
suggests a general approach, noting that the 
concept of “public interest” has to be interpreted 
in necessarily broad terms, thereby giving states 
the right to exercise a “considerable freedom 
(extent) of discretion.” Thus, the ECHR has 
repeatedly stated in its judgements that the 
concept of “public interest” is necessarily subject 
to a broad interpretation. Therefore, the wide 
extent of discretion afforded to legislators for 
social and economic policies and based on sound 
reasoning is deemed natural. 
 
The Court makes a distinction between the public 
(general) interest and the interest of the state, 
pointing to the possibility of differences and even 
contradictions between the two. The government 
may take unpopular decisions, but they have to 
be sufficiently substantiated and reflect the real 
needs of social development, i.e. meet the criteria 
of proportionality and be a proper means of 
addressing a specific problem (Novikov, 2016). 
 
Considering the understanding of society’s 
problems, national authorities are in a better 
position to assess “public interest” than any 
supranational body. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the national authorities to 
initially assess the existence of a problem of 
public interest and justify interference with the 
right to property. Thus, in the research area 
covered by the Convention’s safeguards, the 
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national authorities are given certain 
discretionary powers. 
 
The ECHR recognises that proper application of 
law itself is clearly a “public interest” (ECHR, 
Case Tregubenko v. Ukraine, 2004). 
 
In its decisions, the ECHR emphasises that, 
despite the fact that states are given wide 
discretion when resolving on whether to interfere 
with the right to property of individuals and legal 
entities subject to a legitimate purpose in public 
interest, failure to strike a fair balance between 
the exigencies of public interest and the need to 
respect the fundamental rights of the person who 
is affected by such interference in one way or 
another will be considered a violation of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1. The search for such fair 
balance runs throughout the Convention. 
 
Such fair balance seems important and necessary 
for the state to ensure preconditions for 
exercising a democratic regime of government, 
since it is precisely such levers and 
counterbalances to the state’s power that protect 
the property owner from the unjustified influence 
of the state on their rights. 
 
The Court has repeatedly emphasised that the 
issue of proportionality, the importance of which 
is difficult to overestimate, is key to determining 
such fair balance between the interests of the 
state and those of the individual. The principle of 
proportionality is a general, universal principle of 
law that mandates a commensurate restriction of 
human rights and freedoms for the attainment of 
public ends. The principle of proportionality is 
closely linked to the rule of law. The rule of law 
is the foundation, on which the principle of 
proportionality is based. Instead, the principle of 
proportionality is both a precondition for the 
implementation of the rule of law and its 
necessary consequence (Pogrebnyak, 2008). 
 
Such balance should not be construed as a 
necessity to necessarily achieve “social justice” 
in each particular case. The state shall ensure a 
reasonable proportion between the means used 
and the purpose to be achieved; otherwise such 
measure should be abolished. 
 
When analysing the appropriateness of an 
interference with the right to property, the ECHR 
takes into account the following factors: (a) the 
proportionality of the measures taken by the state 
to the objective to be achieved; b) whether the 
person is subjected to excessive burden as a 
result of the actions by the state; c) whether the 
means used by the state are unjustified or 
unfounded (Syusyel, 2015). 
 
It is worth noting that the issue of the 
proportionality of the constraints to the purpose 
stated is estimative in nature and is determined in 
each case with reference to the actual 
circumstances at hand. In assessing 
proportionality, it should be determined whether 
it is possible to achieve a legitimate objective 
through measures that would be less burdensome 
on the rights and freedoms of the person affected. 
From this, it may be derived that the restrictions 
should not be excessive or greater than is 
necessary to achieve such objective (Maidanyk, 
2015). In deciding whether this requirement was 
met, the Court recognises that the state enjoys a 
wide extent of discretion both in the choice of 
method of action and in determining whether the 
consequences of taking relevant measures are 
justified with regard to the general interest in 
achieving the objective of the law in question. 
However, the Court cannot fail to exercise its 
powers of review and shall determine whether 
the necessary balance was maintained in a 
manner compatible with the applicant’s right to 
“peaceful enjoyment of [their] property” within 
the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 (see judgement in Case ECHR of 
Ukraine-Tyumen v. Ukraine, 2007). 
 
Therefore, the principle of proportionality allows 
for the possibility of encumbrance of the 
subjective right of a person by the authorities not 
in the form of any restrictions whatsoever, but 
only such restrictions, which do not constitute a 
significant individual burden, to the extent that 
such influence transforms the title of the owner 
or a different legal right into a benefit that is 
disadvantageous to its holder. The principle of 
proportionality allows for the restrictions that do 
not interfere with the exercise of legal civil law 
and enables it to be exercised in alignment with 
public interest and the rights of other persons 
(Michurin, 2009). 
 
One of the important components of compliance 
with the principle of proportionality in the 
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of property is the provision of fair and justified 
compensation, despite the fact that the provisions 
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 do not contain a 
clear requirement to that effect. Expropriation of 
property without an appropriate compensation is 
only possible in exceptional cases. The Court 
considers that the compensation shall be 
reasonably related to the value of the property 
and not necessarily correspond to the market 
value of the forfeited property. 
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Another form of interference with the right to 
property of individuals and legal entities by the 
state, which is provided by the provisions of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, is the control over the 
use of property. For the purposes of the 
Convention, the control of the use of property 
means all measures that may in any way partially 
affect the content of the right to property. 
However, when defining “regulatory measures” 
or “control measures” with reference to the use 
of property, the essential difficulties consist in 
establishing the difference between 
expropriation of property and a purely regulatory 
impact on property relations (Fuley, Hembach, 
2011). 
 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 indicates the existence 
of two types of control over the use of property: 
 
1) control over the use of property in line with 
general interests; 2) control over the use of 
property to secure the payment of taxes or other 
dues or penalties. 
 
Each of these types of control is applied by the 
state solely on a temporarily basis, i.e. in order to 
achieve a specific intermediate result and in 
alignment with the requirements of the legality of 
interference. 
 
In its conventional sense, control over the use of 
property does not involve the transfer of property 
or the right to such property, but concerns the 
sovereign powers of the state to regulate property 
relations. In such circumstances, the owner 
retains their property, but may be restricted from 
using it. 
 
Neither Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, nor the 
Court provides a definition of general or public 
interest. The Court refers to the conformity of 
any measures aimed at restricting the peaceful 
enjoyment of property to general interest. The 
boundary between general interest and public 
interest is rather conditional. There is no clear 
indication of the need to invoke general or public 
interest to determine the legality of interference 
with the peaceful enjoyment of property 
(Romanyuk, Maistrenko, 2014). 
 
If we rely on an immediate understanding of the 
phrase “general interest,” this requirement may 
be described as more abstract in understanding 
the limits of state interference with the right to 
property compared to expropriation. Control is 
therefore a more accessible method of interfering 
with property rights, both in general and, in part, 
in the form of the use of property by persons. 
Control over the use of property supports the 
state’s proper discharge of its fiscal function in 
general interest. 
 
For the purposes of determination of the 
relationship between “general interest” and 
“public interest,” it should be noted that, in its 
judgement in James and Others v. The United 
Kingdom dated February 21, 1986, the Court 
stated that even if there were a difference 
between the concepts of “interests of society” 
and “general interests” in Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1, in terms of that specific case, there was no 
fundamental difference between both terms 
(ECHR, Case James and Others v. the United 
Kingdom, 1986). 
 
As the Court has repeatedly emphasised, the 
existence of “public interests,” their objectives 
and the extent of interference (control over) with 
the exercise of the right of private owners 
required to achieve such objectives are 
determined by each state individually. The Court 
proceeds from the fact that the purpose of such 
interest exists and it has the right to investigate it 
for compliance with the results achieved and the 
reasonableness (proportionality) of interference 
with the right to property of owners. 
 
The issue of the proportionality of measures 
taken by the state to control the use of property 
of private owners has repeatedly been the subject 
of consideration of the ECHR. For example, the 
Court has considered several cases, in which 
homeowners complained about the state’s 
control over the use of their property, alleging 
that such homeowners could not enforce the 
evictions of the occupiers who rented relevant 
premises. The Court made different resolutions 
in each of such cases: in the case Spadea and 
Scalabrino v. Italy, the Court found that the 
applicants had not been able to prove their need 
to live in the dwelling in question, which was 
rented by needy elderly women at the time. 
Those women appealed to the municipal 
authorities to provide them with another 
accommodation, which would be cheaper to rent. 
This case involved no violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 (ECHR, Case Spadea and 
Scalabrino v. Italy, 1995). However, in another 
case, Scollo v. Italy, a violation of this provision 
occurred insofar as the applicant had supported 
his disability and the need for them and their 
family to reside in relevant premises with 
documentary evidence (ECHR, Case Scollo v. 
Italy, 1995). 
 
In cases involving Ukraine, the issue of existence 
of fair and proportionate control over property is 
most often raised in connection with 
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consideration of disputes related to pension 
benefits. As a relevant example, the case 
Velikoda v. Ukraine may be quoted, in which the 
applicant with a special status of category one 
liquidator of the of aftermath of the Chornobyl 
disaster and a third group disability appealed to 
the ECHR and complained about the decrease of 
the level of her pension benefits on the basis of 
new changes to applicable legislation. 
 
One of the defining elements in regulating social 
relations in the social area is respecting the 
principle of proportionality between social 
protection of citizens and the financial capacity 
of the state, as well as guaranteeing the right of 
everyone to a sufficient standard of living. 
Therefore, changes to the mechanism for accrual 
of certain types of social benefits and assistance 
are constitutionally permissible to the limits, 
beyond which the very essence of the content of 
the right to social protection is called into 
question. 
 
In the said case, the national courts considered 
the applicant’s complaint concerning the 
reduction of her pension benefits and concluded 
that the amount of her pension payments had 
been reduced after the amendments to relevant 
legislation. The Court found that such reduction 
of the applicant’s pension had apparently been 
due to considerations of economic policies and 
financial difficulties faced by the state. In the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary and 
recognising that the defendant state has a wide 
extent of discretion in striking a balance between 
the rights at issue and its economic policies, the 
Court did not consider that such reduction was 
disproportionate to the legitimate objective 
pursued or placed an undue burden on the 
applicant. The Court ruled that the application 
were to be declared inadmissible as being 
manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Sub-
paragraph “a” of Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 4 of 
Article 35 of the Convention (ECHR, Decision 
Velikoda v. Ukraine, 2014). 
 
It is worth noting that the ECHR had experience 
of the consideration of cases where both the 
unlawful control and expropriation of property 
were found simultaneously. Thus, in the case 
Seryavin and Others v. Ukraine, the applicants, 
citing Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, complained 
that, by entering into an investment contract for 
the reconstruction of the attic and the 
construction of attic floor in the applicants’ 
building without their consent, the local 
authorities illegally interfered with their right to 
own the attic of the building and illegally 
expropriated the applicants’ shares in the attic as 
a result of a district council’s resolution on the 
transfer of relevant premises to investors. In 
support of their arguments, the applicants, inter 
alia, provided a number of resolutions adopted 
by national courts in other unrelated cases, where 
the courts found similar unilateral actions by the 
authorities associated with the reconstruction of 
ancillary premises in apartment buildings 
without the consent of apartment owners to be 
unlawful. 
 
Following the consideration of the said 
application, the Court held that, as a result of the 
execution of the investment contract for the 
reconstruction of the attic premises without the 
applicants’ consent by the government, a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention occurred (i.e. an unlawful control 
over property), as well as a violation of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of 
the expropriation of such attic premises from the 
applicants (ECHR, Case Seryavin and Others v. 
Ukraine, 2011). 
 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 also raises the issue 
of taxation. The Court had to admit that taxation 
is the prerogative of the state and is of a public 
law nature. At the same time, tax collection and 
related relations constitute an interference with 
the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. In 
doing so, the Court recognises that states have the 
right to adopt any fiscal law they deem 
appropriate if the measures taken do not amount 
to unlawful confiscation. In determining whether 
that requirement is fulfilled, the Court recognises 
that states have a wide extent of discretion in the 
development and implementation of fiscal 
policies, and that the Court will respect the 
lawmakers’ judgement in such matters except 
where it is devoid of any reasonable basis 
(ECHR, Case National & Provincial Building 
Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and 
Yorkshire Building Society v. the United 
Kingdom, 1997). 
 
Therefore, states have discretionary powers to 
control the use of property by enacting laws that, 
in particular, entitle financial institutions to 
determine the taxable amounts claimed by the 
payer. The ability to tax property that is actually 
owned by the debtor, but is nominally the 
property of a third party is used to strengthen the 
position of creditors in the process of its 
implementation and is consistent with Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (Dudash, 
2014). Control over the use of property may be 
exercised through the regulation of lease 
relations, regulation of international business 
transactions, etc. 
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In the course of inquiry into the issue of the 
legality of the control over the use of right to 
property, the judgement of the ECHR in the case 
Shchokin v. Ukraine dated October 10, 2010 
merits special consideration. The applicant 
alleged, inter alia, that his property rights had 
been violated as a result of the unlawful 
imposition of additional income tax obligations 
on the applicant by public authorities. In spite of 
the fact that public authorities are given a wide 
extent of discretion in imposing taxes, the Court 
found that a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 occurred. 
 
Thus, the Court held that the lack of the necessary 
clarity and precision in national law, which gave 
room to different interpretations of such an 
important financial matter, violated the “quality 
of law” requirement of the Convention and did 
not provide an adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference with the applicant’s 
property matters by public authorities. Moreover, 
due to ambiguity in the interpretation of 
taxpayers’ rights and obligations, the national 
authorities “opted for the less favourable 
interpretation of the domestic law which resulted 
in the increase in the applicant's income tax 
liability” (ECHR, Case Shchokin v. Ukraine, 
2010). 
 
However, in some cases, despite the fact that the 
case concerned tax matters, the Court applied the 
first rule of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
interference complained of by the applicant. For 
instance, the case Intersplav v. Ukraine 
concerned the denial of the tax authorities to 
grant consent to the refund of VAT on products 
dispatched for export, which, in the applicant’s 
view, constituted an interference with the 
peaceful enjoyment of its property, and such 
interference was disproportionate and led to 
significant losses in the applicant’s business. The 
applicant successfully appealed against such 
systematic denials to court, but VAT 
compensation to the applicant was systematically 
delayed. Such delays were caused by a situation, 
where the public authorities did not confirm 
relevant amounts without actually denying the 
amount of VAT compensation due to the 
applicant. In such circumstances, the Court found 
a violation of the first provision of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 (ECHR, Case Intersplav v. 
Ukraine, 2007). 
 
Therefore, the right to property may not be 
restricted for any purpose other than public 
(general) interests. However, the provisions of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, as well as the case 
law of the ECHR, grants states a wide extent of 
discretion to determine what is in public 
(general) interest and, as a rule, it is sufficient for 
the state concerned to support such interference 
with the right to property with the existence of a 
positive economic effect. This may be explained 
by the international nature of the Court and the 
Convention, which do not aim to create a uniform 
regime of property regulation across the member 
states and do not require the states to pursue 
similar social and economic policies (Fuley, 
Hembach, 2011). 
 
Conclusions 
 
On the basis of the conducted research, we have 
drawn the below conclusions. Given the specific 
attributes of the legal nature of the right to 
property, there is a need to ensure its effective 
legal regulation by the state. However, in certain 
circumstances, such right may be subject to 
restriction and interference. 
 
In order to determine the legality and 
permissibility of such interference with the right 
to property, it is necessary to consistently 
evaluate the presence/absence of such criteria as 
legality, legitimate purpose, and proportionality. 
As a criterion for interference with the right to 
property of any person, legality implies that such 
interference may only be made within and on the 
basis of law, in compliance with the principle of 
rule of law, which includes freedom from 
arbitrariness. Interference may not be based 
solely on domestic law, but such law itself shall 
meet certain quality requirements, specifically: 
be adequately accessible, clear, and predictable. 
In case an inconsistency between national law 
and quality of law requirements is identified, a 
violation is acknowledged without resorting to 
the analysis of other criteria of the legality of 
interference with the right to property. 
 
Interference with the right to property is 
permissible insofar as it has a legitimate purpose 
and is made in order to meet public interest. 
However, it is the correct application of law in 
itself that, undoubtedly, serves public interest. 
Therefore, responsibility for the initial 
assessment of the existence of a problem of 
public concern and substantiation of any 
interference with the right to property rests with 
the national authorities. 
 
Although states have a wide extent of discretion 
in resolving whether to interfere with the right to 
property of individuals and legal entities for a 
legitimate purpose of public interest, failure to 
ensure a fair balance (proportion) between the 
exigencies of public interest and the need to 
  
506 
www.amazoniainvestiga.info         ISSN 2322 - 6307 
respect the fundamental rights of the person who 
is affected by such interference in one way or 
another (proportionality of interference) for the 
sake of attainment of public ends will be 
considered a violation. One of the important 
components of adhering to the principle of 
proportionality in the interference with the right 
to peaceful enjoyment of property is the 
provision of fair and reasonable compensation, 
which must be reasonably related to the value of 
the property and not necessarily consistent with 
the market value of the forfeited property. 
 
In its conventional sense, control over the use of 
property, as a form of interference with the right 
to property, does not involve the transfer of 
property or the right to such property, but 
concerns the sovereign powers of the state to 
regulate property relations in line with general 
interests or to secure the payment of taxes or 
other dues or penalties.  
 
Each of these types of control is applied by the 
state solely on a temporarily basis, i.e. in order to 
achieve a specific intermediate result and in 
alignment with the requirements of the legality of 
the relevant interference. 
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